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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAP, NATO, PFOR

SUBJECT: STATEMENT FOR DPC

REF: (A) STATE 20400

PER REFERENCE (A) STATEMENT TO DPC FOR DELIVERY FEBRUARY 4
FOLLOWS. Q'S AND A'S FOR DPC STATEMENT SENT SEPTTEL.

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR DETERENT POLICY
IN PARTICULAR I WANT TO EXPLAIN WHY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
BELIEVES THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A BROADER RANGE OF STRATEGIC
OPTIONS WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE
SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE. I WANT TO AMPLIFY CERTAIN
POINTS WHICH HAVE BEEN STRESSED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PAST
FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS AND IN THE HAGUE LAST NOVEMBER BY
DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER. SHORTLY THE SECRETARY
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OF DEFENSE IN HIS ANNUAL DEFENSE REPORT WILL BE ADDRESSING
THIS SUBJECT. PRIOR TO THIS WE WANT TO BE SURE THAT
OUR PRINCIPAL ALLIES FULLY COMPREHEND OUR VIEWS AND HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT AND RAISE QUESTIONS. THAT IS THE

PURPOSE OF MY STATEMENT TODAY.

WE HOPE FOR A FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO OUR OBJECTIVES AND NO QUESTION THAT U.S. NUCLEAR POLICIES SUPPORT OUR

CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE NATO AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH MUTUALLY AGREED-TO POLICIES AND STRATEGIES.

THERE IS ONE POINT THAT I WANT TO STRESS AT THE OUT-SET.

PURPOSE IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AT ALL LEVELS. IF DETERRENCE FAILS WE WANT TO PROTECT US AND ALLIED INTERESTS AND RESTORE DETERRENCE. BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY WE STRENGTHEN OUR ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY AND PERSUASIVELY EXTEND THE US NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO ALLIES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING OPTIONS WHICH WILL BEAR SOME REASONABLE RELATION TO THE PROVOCATION THUS ENHANCING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DETERRENT. I THINK THIS WILL BECOME CLEAR AS I DESCRIBE SOME OF THE SPECIFICS. OUR NUCLEAR POLICY AND PROGRAMS ARE CONSTANTLY UNDER REVIEW AND THE REFINEMENT OF THE POLICY IS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE PRINCIPAL MESSAGE YOU WILL DERIVE FROM THIS BRIEFING IS THAT WHILE THE US GOVERNMENT IS ADAPTING TO AND CONSTANTLY REVIEWING CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT WE ARE MOVING DELIBERATELY. REVISIONS TO FORCE CAPABILITIES, DOCTRINE AND TARGETING POLICY DO NOT PORTEND ANY BASIC CHANGE IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY FOR US NUCLEAR FORCES, OR IN THE COMMITMENT OF THOSE FORCES TO NATO. OUR MAJOR AIM IS TO MAXIMIZE DETERRENCE AS STRATEGIC CONDITIONS EVOLVE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE NEWEST TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO US.

BACKGROUND

IN RECENT YEARS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS DESCRIBED ITS STRATEGIC POSTURE PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF DETERRENCE UNDERWRITTEN BY FORCE CAPABILITIES FOR ASSURED DESTRUCTION. HOWEVER,

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WAR PLANS HAVE ALWAYS TARGETED, BESIDES CITIES, A LARGE NUMBER OF WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. IN THE MID 1960S US STRATEGIC POLICY FEATURED TWO MAJOR ELEMENTS: (A) THE ASSURED THREAT OF DESTRUCTION OF THE AGGRESSOR'S URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL ASSETS AND (B) TARGETING OF THE AGGRESSOR'S NUCLEAR ASSETS AS WELL AS OTHER MILITARY TARGETS FOR DAMAGE LIMITATION. WITH THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC ARSENAL DURING THE LATE 1960S IT BECAME CLEAR THAT LIMITING URBAN DAMAGE TO A LOW LEVEL WITH ABMS OR COUNTERFORCE STRIKES WAS NOT A FEASIBLE OBJECTIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, PUBLIC DISCUSSION GAVE MORE EMPHASIS TO THE ASSURED DESTRUCTION OBJECTIVE. HOWEVER, THE US HAS NEVER WHOLLY ABANDONED THE OBJECTIVE OF LIMITING

DAMAGE IN ITS NUCLEAR TARGETING. WHAT CHANGED IN THE LATE 1960S WAS A MATTER OF EMPHASIS IN PUBLIC DEBATE AND PROCUREMENT POLICY.

THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE NUCLEAR

PLANNING GROUP WILL RECALL THAT THERE HAVE BEEN TWO PRIOR BRIEFINGS IN THAT BODY ON THE VERY SENSITIVE SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR ARGETING. ONE WAS GIVEN BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA IN 1966, AND ANOTHER BY SECRETARY LAIRD IN 1972. IN THOSE BRIEFINGS WE POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG TARGETED A MAJOR PORTION OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS. SUCH MILITARY TARGETS INCLUDE A VARIETY OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS NUCLEAR LAUNCH FACILITIES, MISSILE SILOS, NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES, COMMAND CENTERS, MILITARY AIRFIELDS AND HEADQUARTERS AMONG OTHER THINGS. THOSE WHO HEARD OUR EARLIER BRIEFINGS WILL RECALL THAT THE NUMBER OF PRE-PLANNED OPTIONS INVOLVED A LARGE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, SPECIFIC TARGETS AND THE WAY IN WHICH WE ALLOCATE OUR MILITARY FORCES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND CLOSELY HELD MATTER. WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS PUBLICLY. IN PUBLIC WE HAVE TENDED TO STRESS ASSURED DESTRUCTION BECAUSE WE FELT THAT THIS MAXIMIZED DETERRENCE AND BECAUSE THIS WAS FOR MANY YEARS THE PRINCIPAL BASIS ON WHICH WE DETERMINED THE SIZE AND TO SOME EXTENT THE COMPOSITION OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES. WE ARE NOW GIVING MORE PROMINENCE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO OUR PLANS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IN CURRENT STRATEGIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES THIS WILL HELP TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE.

THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE POLICY IS TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH A BROADER AND MORE FLEXIBLE RANGE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS DESIGNED FIRST AND FOREMOST TO BOLSTER DETERRENCE OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES. IN ADDITION, AND THIS IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IF DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL, THE REVISIONS IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY ARE INTENDED TO LIMIT DAMAGE BY LIMITING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, TERMINATE HOSTILITIES QUICKLY AND REESTABLISH DETERRENCE IN ORDER TO IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION BEFORE RESORT BY BOTH SIDES TO A MASSIVE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. THE MAIN POINT THAT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IS THAT BOTH SIDES NOW HAVE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE, INVULNERABLE SECOND-STRIKE FORCES. WITH THOSE INVULNERABLE SECOND-STRIKE FORCES THERE IS GREAT RISK THAT THE EMPLOYMENT BY ONE SIDE OF ITS FORCES AGAINST THE CITIES OF THE OTHER SIDE IN AN ALL-OUT STRIKE WILL IMMEDIATELY BRING A COUNTERSTRIKE AGAINST ITS OWN CITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH AN ALL-OUT STRIKE AGAINST AN OPPONENT'S CITIES CAN BE CONTEMPLATED HAS NARROWED CONSIDERABLY.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS 1972 FOREIGN POLICY
REPORT "NO PRESIDENT SHOULD BE LEFT WITH ONLY ONE
STRATEGIC

COURSE OF ACTION, PARTICULARLY THAT OF ORDERING THE MASS
DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY CIVILIANS AND FACILITIES". WITHOUT
ALTERNATIVES, THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT
MIGHT BE CALLED INTO QUESTION OVER A BROAD RANGE OF
POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

OUR THINKING WHICH HAS TAKEN SEVERAL YEARS OF STUDY
DURING A PERIOD OF DYNAMIC STRATEGIC CHANGE AFFECTS
EMPLOYMENT AND DECLARATORY POLICY, NOT NECESSARILY PRO-
CUREMENT POLICY. THIS IS A POINT I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO
STRESS AND A POINT THAT HAS BEEN MADE PREVIOUSLY BY
SECRETARY SCHLESINGER. IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT ADDI-
TIONAL OPTIONS IN OUR OPERATIONAL PLANS AND TARGETING
WE DO NOT NECESSARILY NEED TO ACQUIRE NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS.
GIVEN OUR EXISTING FORCE POSTURE, WHICH ALREADY GIVES US
THE BASIS FOR DEVELOPING A NUMBER OF OPTIONS, CHANGES
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IN TARGETING DOCTRINE DO NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE
SIZING OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES.

THE EMPLOYMENT POLICY

I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF OUR
POLICY FOR PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN
DOING SO I WANT TO STRESS AGAIN THAT WE CONSIDER
THIS A
REFINEMENT OF EXISTING POLICY AIMED AT ENHANCING DETERRENCE.
OUR REVISED PLAN WILL PROVIDE OPTIONS TO USE FORCE IN A
CONTROLLED WAY, OVER A BROAD SPECTRUM, WHILE PRESERVING
THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TARGETS OF VALUE TO THE ENEMY.
THUS, OUR NUCLEAR RESPONSE BECOMES MORE CREDIBLE
THEREBY MAKING DETERRENCE MORE EFFECTIVE. THIS POLICY
EXTENDS DETERRENCE OVER A WIDER SPECTRUM OF CONTINGENCIES,
THUS MAKING THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY AN
OPPONENT LESS LIKELY. OUR DETERRENCE OBJECTIVES FOR
NUCLEAR FORCES ARE:

(1) TO DETER NUCLEAR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES, ITS FORCES, AND ITS BASES OVERSEAS.

(2) IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES,
TO DETER ATTACKS -- CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR -- BY
NUCLEAR POWERS AGAINST U.S. ALLIES AND AGAINST THOSE OTHER
NATIONS WHOSE SECURITY IS DEEMED IMPORTANT TO U.S.
INTERESTS.

(3) TO INHIBIT COERCION OF THE UNITED STATES BY
NUCLEAR POWERS AND ,IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER U.S. AND
ALLIED FORCES, HELP INHIBIT COERCION OF U.S. ALLIES
BY SUCH POWERS.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD RELY PRIMARILY
ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DETER CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION

BY BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. NEVERTHELESS,
THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF
NECESSARY IN RESPONSE TO CONVENTIONAL

AGGRESSION.

SHOULD CONFLICT OCCUR, THE MOST CRITICAL EMPLOYMENT
OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK EARLY WAR TERMINATION, ON TERMS
ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, AT THE
LOWEST LEVEL OF CONFLICT FEASIBLE AND HENCE THE LOWEST
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POSSIBLE LEVEL OF DAMAGE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
ALLIES. THIS OBJECTIVE REQUIRES PLANNING A WIDE RANGE
OF LIMITED NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS WHICH COULD BE USED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUPPORTING POLITICAL AND MILITARY
MEASURES (INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL FORCES) TO CONTROL
ESCALATION.

SUCH PLANNING WOULD DEVELOP LIMITED, SELECTIVE
EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS FOR RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, IN CONCERT WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH
WOULD IN FACT PROTECT VITAL US AND ALLIED INTERESTS AND
LIMIT CAPABILITIES TO CONTINUE AGGRESSION. IN ADDITION,
THESE OPTIONS SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO THE ENEMY A DETER-
MINATION TO RESIST AGGRESSION, COUPLED WITH A DESIRE TO
EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

THUS, THE OPTIONS TO BE DEVELOPED SHOULD PROVIDE FOR
A LEVEL, SCOPE, AND DURATION OF VIOLENCE WHICH ARE LIMITED
IN A MANNER WHICH CAN BE CLEARLY AND CREDIBLY COMMUNICATED
TO THE ENEMY. THE OPTIONS SHOULD (A) HOLD SOME VITAL
ENEMY TARGETS HOSTAGE TO SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION BY
SURVIVABLE NUCLEAR FORCES, AND (B) PERMIT CONTROL OVER
THE TIMING AND PACE OF ATTACK EXECUTION, IN ORDER TO
PROVIDE THE ENEMY OPPORTUNITIES TO RECONSIDER HIS ACTIONS.
THESE GOALS ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH NATO STRATEGY AND
WITH AGREED NATO GUIDELINES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.

WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED TO YOU ARE THE BROAD OUTLINES
OF OUR NUCLEAR POLICY AS WE HAVE GRADUALLY MODIFIED IT
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. WE ARE NOW WORKING TO
TRANSLATE THIS BROAD POLICY GUIDANCE INTO SPECIFIC
OPERATIONAL PLANS. WE ARE ALSO STUDYING THE PROCUREMENT
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW TARGETING CONCEPTS BUT NO DECISIONS
HAVE BEEN MADE TO PROCURE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON
THE BASIS OF THESE CONCEPTS. AS OUR PLANS DEVELOP FURTHER
WE INTEND TO KEEP NATO FULLY INFORMED THROUGH APPROPRIATE
BODIES SUCH AS THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

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BEFORE CONCLUDING I WANT TO ADDRESS SEVERAL QUESTIONS
RAISED ABOUT THIS POLICY.

FIRST, I STRESS THAT OUR PRIMARY AIM IS TO BOLSTER
DETERRENCE ACROSS THE COMPLETE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT.

SECOND, WE CONSIDER THE OPTIONS WE ARE DEVELOPING TO
BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE OF
ATTACK ON OUR ALLIES BECAUSE IT ENHANCES CREDIBILITY.
RATHER THAN DECOUPLING THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES FROM
THE ALLIANCE, A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THESE MEASURES IS
TO CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUED COUPLING OF
U.S. NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES EVEN MORE FIRMLY TO THE DEFENSE
OF OUR ALLIES.

THIRD, THIS REFINED TARGETING DOCTRINE DOES NOT
NECESSARILY REQUIRE ANY NEW STRATEGIC FORCES. AS PRE-
VIOUSLY MENTIONED SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAS POINTED OUT
THE SIZING OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES WILL BE SET IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE LIMITATIONS WE ARE ABLE TO WORK OUT WITH
THE SOVIET UNION IN SALT.

FOURTH, THE U.S. IS IN NO WAY SEEKING A FIRST-STRIKE
OR A DISARMING CAPABILITY. I WOULD NOTE THAT UNDER THE
SALT ONE INTERIM AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS ARE ALLOWED 62
SUBMARINES AND 950 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSI-
LES, AMONG OTHER STRATEGIC FORCES. IT SHOULD BE
CLEAR TO ALL OF US THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO
BEGIN TO ELIMINATE THE CITY DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES
EMBODIED IN THEIR ICBM AND SLBM FORCES. ATTAINING A FULL
DISARMING CAPABILITY IS NOT AN OPTION THAT IS OPEN TO THE
UNITED STATES OR TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE INTEND TO CON-
TINUE UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO RETAIN A SURVIVABLE
RETALIATORY ELEMENT IN OUR STRATEGIC FORCES.

FIFTH, FINALLY, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE NEW CONCEPTS
WHICH WE HAVE DESCRIBED IN ANY WAY INCONSISTENT WITH SALT.
THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE IN SALT CONCERN THE SIZING AND
EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES AND WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY MODIFIC-
ATIONS IN NUCLEAR PLANNING. KISSINGER

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